Yongwei Nian
JOB MARKET CANDIDATE
Field: Economics
Research Interests: Development Economics, Political Economy
(Expected) Graduation: June 2024
References
- Francesco Decarolis francesco.decarolis@unibocconi.it
- Stefano Fiorin stefano.fiorin@unibocconi.it
- Guido Tabellini guido.tabellini@unibocconi.it
Contact
Email: yongwei.nian@phd.unibocconi.it
Phone: (+39) 348 6124341
JOB MARKET PAPER
Curbing Bureaucratic Information Manipulation
Bureaucrats are often incentivized to manipulate information, which may have real consequences. Leveraging China's 2009 reform punishing economic data manipulation and counties' quasi-random reform exposure, I provide rich causal evidence showing that the reform led to: (1) a decrease in GDP growth manipulation amounting to 5% of reported GDP growth, driven by a reputational discipline effect; (2) an increase in local officials' development effort manifested in both policy changes and downstream impacts, consistent with an effort reallocation effect. These results thus highlight the far-reaching costs of such manipulation and the welfare implications of curbing it.
PUBLICATIONS
Nian, Y. (2023). Incentives, penalties, and rural air pollution: Evidence from satellite data. Journal of Development Economics, 161, 103049.
Nian, Y., & Wang, C. (2023). Go with the Politician. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 15(2), 467-496.
WORKING PAPERS
Virtuous Leaders and Government Corruption, with C. Shen and Z. Zhou
Reciprocity and State Capacity, with Y. Luo and M. Zhang