Overview.

The vast majority of advanced industrial democracies have parliamentary regimes. In most of those, proportional representation electoral rules virtually ensure that no single political party has a majority of legislative seats, and so government by coalition is the norm. Partly for this reason, the study of coalition politics and parliamentary government has become one of the largest subfields in comparative research on democratic processes. Arguably, this subfield is as theoretically and methodologically advanced as any in comparative politics. One premise of this course is that, despite the relative sophistication of this subfield, there is still significant work to do and many more innovations to be made.

We begin the course by covering the three biggest “traditional” questions in coalition research: which parties get into government, how parties distribute the set of cabinet ministries, and how long the government is expected to last. We then move to recent innovations in the subfield, which focus on such questions as how coalition governments make policy and how voters attribute responsibility for policy outcomes to individual coalition parties.

Evaluation.

Class participation: 30%
Discussion leadership: 30%
Research paper: 40%.

The Honor Code.

Università Bocconi conceives of education as an ongoing process that stretches across a person’s entire professional life. The University hopes that the entire Bocconi community will respect the values of fairness and correctness associated with it, values which inspire and guide the conduct of all community members as they pursue common objectives and a shared mission. The Università Bocconi Honor Code is published at http://www.unibocconi.eu/honorcode. We encourage all students to read it. We remind you that improper use of the “Attendance” recording procedure by students will result in sanctions in compliance with the Bocconi Honor Code.
Schedule.

April 9

Overview of Coalition Research

Laver and Schofield (1998)

April 16

Government Formation and Survival

Martin and Stevenson (2001)
Martin and Stevenson (2010)
Glasgow, Golder and Golder (2012)
Golder, Golder and Siegel (2012)
Martin and Vanberg (2014a)
Golder, Golder and Siegel (2014)
Kayser, Orlowski and Rehmert (N.d.)
Browne, Frendreis and Gleiber (1984)
Strom et al. (1988)
King et al. (1990)
Warwick (1992)
Lupia and Strom (1995)
Diermeier and Stevenson (1999)
Diermeier and Stevenson (2000)
Chiba, Martin and Stevenson (2015)

April 30

Bargaining and Portfolio Allocation

Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998)
Martin and Vanberg (2003)
Golder (2010)
Gamson (1961)
Browne and Franklin (1973)
Browne and Frendreis (1980)
Morelli (1999)
Warwick and Druckman (2006)
Carroll and Cox (2007)
Bäck, Debus and Dumont (2011)
Cutler et al. (2016)
Martin and Vanberg (2019b)
May 7

Coalitions and Policymaking

Laver and Shepsle (1990)
Thies (2001)
Lipsmeyer and Pierce (2011)
Martin and Vanberg (2005)
Martin and Vanberg (2014a)
Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006)
Martin and Vanberg (2013)
Goodhart (2013)
Martin and Vanberg (2019a)
Tsebelis (1995)
Tsebelis (1999)
Bawn (1999)
Angelova et al. (2018)

May 14

Coalitions and Voters

Kedar (2005)
Duch, May and Armstrong II (2010)
Indridason (2011)
Martin and Vanberg (2008)
Sagarzazu and Klüver (2017)
Fortunato (2019b)
Fortunato and Stevenson (2012)
Gschwend, Meffert and Stötzer (2017)
Lin et al. (2017)
Bowler, Gschwend and Indridason (N.d.)
Fortunato (2019a)
Klüver and Spoon (N.d.)

May 21

Paper Draft Presentations
List of Readings


